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Abstract
This paper considers firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when
demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist
providing flexible resources leads to underinvestment in the flexible resource and
overinvestment in the local resource. Moreover, investment responds to demand
correlation differently under monopoly and social optimum. This implies that to
analyze investment efficiency in industries with correlated demand (e.g., cloud com-
puting and sharing economy), we need data on both costs and correlations.
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For firms in various industries, capacity investment decision involves both local and flex-
ible capacities. In particular, firms often need to invest in their own capacity before
demand for their products is realized, and such investments are difficult to reverse. After
the demand is realized, firms have the option to further invest in a flexible resource to
accommodate excess demand. Cloud computing—the leasing of computer services, com-
puting power and storage on an unprecedented scale—is one such flexible resource. While
local computing capacity can support a firm’s average demand, cloud computing is able
to scale services on demand and accommodate the workload that exceeds what the local
capacity can handle.1 Accordingly, firms can use cloud computing as a flexible resource
for business continuity and disaster recovery plans. In addition to IT, firms have to decide
whether to rent or buy office space; and people, whether to use public or private means
of transport. In recent years, the sharing economy—like Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb—has
further increased people’s choices of flexible resources in transport and property. Another
example is electricity, where firms have to decide whether to buy electricity from public
utilities, which deliver instant services, or to invest in their own private generators.
Another important characteristic of these markets is that demand is uncertain and
correlated. For instance, in the cloud computing market, computing demand varies daily
and is correlated globally and seasonally. Geographically, computing demand from coun-
tries lying close to each other is positively correlated, whereas demand from countries that
are located in different time zones is negatively correlated. Seasonally, retailers increase
computing demand during the holiday season.2 As argued by Harms and Yamartino
(2010), even the largest cloud provider will not be able to fully resolve issues related
to uncertainty and correlation by aggregating demand. Similarly, time and weather are
common drivers of correlated demand in electricity and transport: household consump-
tion of electricity tends to peak in the evening, while workplace consumption tends to
peak in the daytime, and people most want a taxi during rush hours, holidays, and in
1The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology provides five defining characteristics of
cloud computing: on-demand service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and mea-
sured service. This paper focuses on the definition of on-demand service and rapid elasticity.




Despite demand correlations being very common, the effect of them on investments
is unknown. And providers of flexible resources often need to make their capacity in-
vestments under such demand uncertainties. For example, on 25 August 2013, Amazon
struggled to keep up with the growing computing demand, and an IT problem at one of
its cloud datacenters had caused many users of major web services such as Instagram,
Vine, and Netflix to experience lengthy delays and reduced data transfer speeds for sev-
eral hours.3 This raises the interesting questions of whether investments in local and
flexible resources are efficient and how they are shaped by demand correlations.
I consider two firms, whose demand is uncertain and correlated, that make their
investment decision in local resources. A monopoly provider of flexible resources (e.g.,
Amazon, Google or Microsoft), observing firms’ local investment, decides how much to
invest in capacity and sets the price for its flexible resources (e.g., Amazon Web Services
(AWS), Google Cloud Platform or Microsoft Azure).4 After demand is realized, firms can
buy flexible resources if demand exceeds their local capacity. One should keep in mind
the “firm” here refers to the seller of final services to the consumers, and the “provider”
to the supplier of flexible resources. Thus, investment occurs on both sides: the firm
choosing between local and flexible resources, and the provider investing in its flexible
capacity.
I show that the provider of flexible resources tends to underinvest in its capacity
with respect to the socially optimal level, whereas firms tend to overinvest in their local
capacity. Such inefficiencies are due to the monopolist’s market power. Firms invest
in local capacity to avoid being exploited by the monopolist, which in turn reduces the
monopolist’s investment incentives (see Proposition 2).
In addition, I show that both socially optimal and monopoly investments in flexible
resources increase with correlation if the investment cost of flexible resources is small
3See “Instagram, Vine and Netflix hit by Amazon glitch,” BBC News, 26 August 2013, available
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-23839901. Note that capacity can be interpreted in two
ways: number of physical servers or service quality. In the former case, there is a maximum traffic that
each server can handle. In the latter case, even if the capacity does not hit the limit, high demands can
put a costly strain on servers, which results in poor quality of service.
4The motivating example is cloud computing, but as mentioned at the beginning, this model can be
applied to many other industries with flexible resources.
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enough, and decrease with correlation if the flexible resource is costly. The reason is that
as correlation increases, the social planner and the provider either “win big” when the
demand realization of the two firms is high or “lose big” when the demand realization
of the two firms is low. If the flexible resource is cheap, the social planner and the
provider need not worry about losing. Rather, they will focus on reaping the benefits
from the winning outcome, and therefore invest more as correlation increases. On the
contrary, if the flexible resource is expensive, losing is costly, and thus they invest less
as correlation increases (see Propositions 1 and 3). I also find that the monopolist’s
investment in flexible resources is more likely to be decreasing in demand correlation due
to excessive local investments by firms (see Proposition 4). These results suggest that
the cost condition and the degree of demand correlation have important consequences
for investments in markets, e.g., for cloud computing and the sharing economy (see the
conclusion for a more detailed discussion).
1.1 Paper Contribution and the Literature
This paper’s main contribution to the literature is that it identifies the type of investment
inefficiencies that might arise in the presence of multiple resources and demand uncer-
tainty. Although the study of investment in local versus flexible resources and investment
under demand uncertainty are by no means unheard of, their combination has not been
explored yet.
More specifically, this paper relates to several areas of the literature. The first is
capacity-pricing games, which dates back to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), and was
extended by Reynolds and Wilson (2000) and de Frutos and Fabra (2011) to incorporate
demand uncertainty. Building on their results, I study firms’ choices between two types
of resources and introduce both demand uncertainty and demand correlation. This also
distinguishes my work from Goyal and Netessine (2007) and Anupindi and Jiang (2008),
where firms cannot invest in both local and flexible resources.
The second area concerns operational management. For example, Lee (2009) considers
the optimal investment of a computing service provider when there is a single resource,
and Niyato et al. (2009) study the optimal choice between private and public comput-
ing services in a monopoly and an oligopoly market, yet in a setting without demand
correlation. By incorporating demand correlation, an interesting finding of this paper is
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that investment can increase with correlation, which is in contrast to the common belief
that only negative correlations are valuable because providers can aggregate demand and
reduce the risk.5 The reason is that when capacity is cheap, the “win big” effect prevails;
thus, the provider may invest more as correlation increases. Other papers in operational
management, e.g., Van Miegham (1998), and Bish and Wang (2004), have failed to ex-
plain why investment inefficiencies may arise in the presence of demand uncertainty and
demand correlation.
The third area concerns real options (RO) in finance, which focuses on the role of
RO in providing flexibility to management decisions. However, unlike financial assets,
capacity investments in IT are not tradable, and they are therefore not valued based on
levels of risk. Instead, they are priced by a third party, which is the resource provider
in this model. Thus, the study of the investment incentives of the resource provider is
important here, but not in RO literature.6
Finally, this paper relates to the literature on cloud computing. Cloud computing
has emerged as a new business model for managing computing and storage resources
for firms and a new source of entertainment and communication services for consumers.
As the cloud market is still in its infancy, many classic economic issues such as pricing,
investment strategies, and the appropriate market structure are still unclear. Recently,
there has been a flurry of research on the opportunities and obstacles for the adoption
of cloud computing; see, for example, Armbrust et al. (2009), Harms and Yamartino
(2010), and Marston et al. (2011). The existing literature, however, has mostly tackled
the problem from an engineering rather than an economic perspective, and much less so
from a theoretical one.7 This paper is a first attempt at understanding the impact of
demand correlation on investments in this industry.
5See, for instance, p. 218 of Bayrak et al. (2011).
6See, for instance, Angelou and Economides (2005), Benaroch and Kauffman (1999) and Kauffman
et al. (2002) for details on the limitations of RO’s applicability in IT investments.
7Recent theoretical work includes Wang (2014) and this paper. However, Wang focuses on user
adoption of cloud computing without any investment on the provider’s side. See also Fershtman and
Gandal (2012) for a survey of the literature on the economic issues of cloud computing.
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2 The Model
Demands. Two firms, 1 and 2, offer services to consumers, who have inelastic demand
and a willingness to pay of r for either firm’s service. I assume that the two firms are
not competing against each other, so each firm sets the monopoly price r to extract all
consumer surplus.8 The demand (e.g., the total number of consumers) of each firm is
uncertain, and the demands of the two firms are correlated. More specifically, demands
for firms 1 and 2, denoted by x and y respectively, are drawn from a joint density h(x, y)
with support [0,∞)× [0,∞). The density of the demand for firm 1’s service, x, is given
by a marginal distribution f(x) =
∫∞
0
h(x, y)dy. Similarly, the density of the demand for
firm 2’s service, y, is given by g(y) =
∫∞
0
h(x, y)dx. In the following analysis, I focus on
the case where both x and y follow an exponential distribution with a scale parameter
of 1.9 More particularly, the distribution functions of x and y, F (x) and G(y), and the
corresponding density functions, f(x) and g(y), are respectively




To characterize the correlation between the two firms’ demands, I follow Gumbel (1960),
where the joint distribution function H(x, y) and the joint density function h(x, y) are
given by
H(x, y) =(1− e−x)(1− e−y)(1 + αe−x−y),
h(x, y) =e−x−y[1 + α(2e−x − 1)(2e−y − 1)],
where −1 < α < 1 is a measure of correlation.10
8Since the two firms are not competing, the qualitative results of the analysis with inelastic demand
go through even if demand is elastic.
9The main results carry through with a uniform distribution, the proof of which is available upon
request.
10Strictly speaking, ρ = cov(x,y)√
var(x)var(y)
is the coefficient of correlation, but since α and ρ move in the
same direction (more precisely, ρ = α4 , see Equation (3.10) on p. 706 of Gumbel 1960), there is no loss
of generality in saying that α is a measure of correlation.
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Investment technologies. To serve the demands, each firm needs to build a capacity,
and serving a customer takes up one unit of capacity of the firm. To do this, firms can
either invest in their own local resource L or they can buy flexible resource K from the
market. The difference lies in that investments in local resources are irreversible and
these resources are for the exclusive use of the investing firm, while flexible resources can
be bought from the market instantly when needed and released when not needed. An
example of flexible resources is cloud computing, which is an on-demand service. The
unit cost of a local resource and a flexible resource are denoted by cL and cK respectively.
I assume that the local resource is supplied competitively, so that firms can buy L at a
price cL, while the flexible resource is supplied by a monopoly. Hereafter, I use the “firm”
to refer to the seller of final services to the consumers, and the “provider” to refer to the
supplier of flexible resources.
I consider the following game:
• Stage 1: firms 1 and 2 invest in their own local capacity L1 and L2 simultaneously;
• Stage 2: the provider invests in its flexible resource capacity K;
• Stage 3: the provider sets a per unit price for flexible resources p (a simple linear
tariff);11
• Stage 4: demands x and y are realized and firms decide whether and if so, how
much to buy the flexible resource.12
I make the following assumptions. First, r > cL, so that there is incentive to purchase
local resources. Second, I focus on the case where cK < cL. This could be reasonable
11In practice, a non-linear tariff is also possible. For example, Amazon and Dropbox provide basic
storage services for free and additional storage for a fee. It would be interesting to analyze the optimal
pricing scheme under demand uncertainty but such a topic would require substantial extension, which is
beyond the scope of this paper.
12The timing of this model, where firms invest first, fits the scenario where some flexible resources
such as cloud computing offers more flexibility in managing demand uncertainty than local resources.
Alternatively, one could consider the case where firms observe the provider’s investment in flexible
resources before deciding their own local investment. Even in this setting, the main results go through
provided price is chosen after the capacity decision, as the monopoly price will emerge as long as demand is
inelastic. Another alternative is to consider the case where p is chosen prior to L, but the underinvestment
problem will still occur because the provider will never price at marginal cost as its profit will become
zero and it will not have any incentive to invest.
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to the extent that flexible resources e.g., cloud computing usually exhibit significant
economies of scale compared to local resources e.g., on-premise servers. Here I focus
on the specification with r = 1, cL = 0.5 and cK ∈ [0, 0.5].13 Third, when firms are
indifferent to buying and not buying the flexible resource, they will always buy it. The
solution concept adopted here is subgame perfect equilibrium.
3 Social Optimum
The social planner chooses L1, L2 and K so as to maximize social welfare, which is defined
as expected demand served minus investment costs (recall that r = 1). Figure 1 illustrates



























Figure 1: Demand for Flexible Resources.
In Area ∅, both demands x and y are small and hence can be served by local capacities.
Area I1 captures the situation where y can be served by firm 2’s local capacity L2, but
since x exceeds what firm 1’s local capacity L1 can serve, firm 1 needs to buy x − L1
flexible resources. Area I2 shows the reverse situation where firm 2 buys y − L2 flexible
resources. In Area II, both x and y exceed what the two firms’ local capacities can serve,
but by buying additional flexible resources, all the demands can still be served. Notice
that in all the cases above, all demands are served. Area III represents the situation where
x can be served by local capacity alone, but y is so large that not even the combination
13These assumptions are innocuous for two reasons. First, setting r = 1 is only a normalization.
Second, the main results hold more generally as long as the flexible resource is more efficient, i.e.,
cK < cL.
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of local and flexible resources can serve them all. Area IV shows the reverse situation
where y < L2, but x is very large. Finally, Area V captures the situation where both x
and y are so large that they are not fully served even when all the capacity of flexible

















− cKK − cL(L1 + L2). (1)
Let Ω(L1, L2, K) denote the probability of x and y falling in areas {III}+{IV }+{V }.
We can show that the social planner only invests in flexible resources, the level of which
is given by





h(x, y)dydx = cK ,




denote the solutions to the maximization problem (1). Then we have
Proposition 1. The social planner only invests in the flexible resource (i.e., L∗1 = L
∗
2 = 0
and K∗ > 0). Moreover, there exists a cutoff level c¯ such that the socially optimal
investment in flexible resources K∗ increases with demand correlation α if cK ≤ c¯, but
decreases with demand correlation if cK > c¯.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The social planner only invests in flexible resources because flexible resources can
be used for both firms and they are less expensive than local resources (i.e., cK < cL).
Moreover, as the degree of demand correlation increases, the probability of getting either
high or low demand realizations increases, which means that the social planner either
“wins big” or “loses big”. The impact of an increase in demand correlation therefore
depends on the cost of the flexible resource. If the investment cost is sufficiently low,
then losing is cheap and the social planner will focus on reaping the benefits of high
demand realizations. Therefore, investment increases with correlation. On the contrary,
if the investment cost is large enough, the social planner will aim at minimizing the risk
of losing, so investment decreases with correlation.
9
4 Monopoly
Suppose now that there is a monopoly provider for the flexible resource that chooses p
and K to maximize its expected profit. Since each consumer has inelastic demand, each
firm will set the price equal to r. This means that a firm will buy flexible resources to
serve its customers whenever the price for the flexible resource is less than or equal to
r—in other words, firms’ demand for flexible resources is also inelastic. Given L1, L2,
K and the monopoly price pm, the demand for flexible resources is the same as that in
Figure 1 as long as pm ≤ r, which means that we must have
pm = r (2)
in Stage 3. This is because the monopolist can extract all the value of the flexible resource.
The investment of the provider is then determined by










h(x, y)dydx = cK , (3)
which equates the monopolist’s private benefits from investment with the costs.










The first term shows that the whole demand is served when demand is below local ca-
pacity. The second term shows that capacity is saturated when demand exceeds local
capacity. Finally, the third term represents the total spending in local capacity. Then,
the equilibrium investment in L1 is determined by
1− F (L1) ≤ cL. (4)
The second-order condition is also satisfied.
Similarly for firm 2, the equilibrium investment in L2 is determined by
1−G(L2) ≤ cL. (5)




m denote the solutions to this set of equations. It should be clear that the
14The firm only gets positive profit from investing in its local capacity because the surplus of the
consumers, who are served by utilizing the flexible resource, is extracted entirely.
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monopoly outcome diverges from the social optimum because firms invest in a positive
amount of local capacities.
Proposition 2. The monopolistic provider underinvests in the flexible resource relative





Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition is that the monopolist sells the flexible resource at the monopoly price,
which extracts all consumer surplus. Anticipating this, the firm will invest in local re-
sources L even if L is less efficient compared with K, in order to gain part of the consumer
surplus. As a consequence, the benefit of investing in flexible resources for the monopolist
is lower than that for the social planner, and hence the monopolist underinvests. Notice
that Proposition 2 holds more generally for any rationing rule. The reason is that firms
pay the monopoly price and, thus, all their profits in serving a customer with the flexible
resource are extracted. As a result, rationing rules do not affect firms’ profits and hence
their investment incentives.
Turning to the impact of correlation, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under monopoly, there is a positive amount of local investment by the
firms (i.e., Lm1 = L
m
2 > 0). Moreover, there exists a cutoff level c such that the monopo-
list’s investment in flexible resources Km increases with demand correlation α if cK ≤ c,
but decreases with demand correlation if cK > c.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The impact of an increase in demand correlation on both socially optimal and equilib-
rium investments depends on whether the flexible resource is significantly more efficient
than the local resource, which is consistent with the intuition in Proposition 1. However,
the monopolist’s investment is more likely to be decreasing in demand correlation, as
shown in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. The smallest cK above which investment in flexible resources decreases
with demand correlation is larger at the social optimum than that under monopoly, i.e.,
c¯ > c.
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Proof. See Appendix D.
The intuition is that local investment is zero at the social optimum but positive in
the monopoly case. Thus, while the monopolist has to bear the risk associated with low
demand realizations under which the firms will rely on their local capacity only, there is
no such risk under the social optimum, which makes the social planner more willing to
invest in flexible resources as demand correlation increases compared to the monopolist.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has analyzed firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when
demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing
flexible resources distorts investment incentives—namely, underinvestment in the flexible
resource and overinvestment in the local resource. Moreover, the impact of demand cor-
relation on investments depends on the investment cost: if the cost is small, investments
in flexible resources under social optimum and monopoly both increase with correlation;
if the cost is large, they go in opposite direction. These results have important implica-
tions for investments in the market for cloud computing. For instance, it is often argued
that the emergence of cloud computing reduces the costs of computing power and storage
significantly. While the marginal cost of producing an extra unit of computing power is
close to zero, the costs of electricity for powering up thousands of machines and cooling
them, as well as managing, maintaining, and implementing the relevant hardware and
software used in a large server farm are far from negligible.15 Moreover, although storing
a large amount of data may be inexpensive, managing large data sets and retrieving the
relevant data at the right time can be costly. Admittedly, the cloud computing market is
growing unpredictably and there is no clear indication or consensus on how it will develop.
For the time being, this paper shows that analyzing data both on cost and on demand
represents a useful first step towards a fuller understanding of the nascent industry.
Here are some important topics that lie beyond the scope of this paper but would
be appropriate for further work. The first is to consider product differentiation. For
15The New York Times reported that datacenters worldwide use about 30 billion watts of electricity,
which is roughly equivalent to the output of 30 nuclear power plants. See “Power, Pollution and the
Internet,” The New York Times, 22 September 2012, available at http://nyti.ms/NFuUvJ.
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example, assuming that cloud computing services (such as Dropbox storage services)
and local storage services are differentiated—how, then, would the investment strategy
change? Second, it would be interesting to study the consequences of vertical integration.
For instance, what will happen if upstream cloud computing firms such as Microsoft and
Google also enter the downstream market of software applications? Third, it would be
interesting to think about how spot pricing (i.e., state-dependent pricing) can change
investment incentives in an environment with both flexible and local resources. Although
spot pricing is rarely used in the cloud computing market (except for AWS), electricity
is bought and sold at spot prices in electricity markets.16 And as argued by Carr (2005)
and Jeff Bezos in Stone (2013), today’s IT supply would likely transform from companies’
private capacity into a centralized utility service, just as electricity became a utility a
century ago.
Finally, one could examine the potential merits of policies that can remedy the un-
derinvestment problem. Since surplus appropriation originates from market power, it
seems reasonable to investigate whether introducing more competition in the market for
flexible resources—thereby forcing down the price—would incentivize the providers and
the firms to behave optimally. The characterization of the equilibrium under competi-
tion, however, remains a challenge because in the related model of capacity-price game
of de Frutos and Fabra (2011), the equilibrium in the pricing stage is a mixed-strategy
equilibrium and provider capacity choices are asymmetric, even if they consider one type
of resources and exogenous demand. In a model with two types of resources, the demand
for flexible resources becomes endogenous. More specifically, it is determined by L and
α, which, in turn, affect the providers’ mixed strategy in prices. I leave the details of
such a model for future work.
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Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
The social optimum is obtained by differentiating Equation (1) with respect to L1, L2
and K.
The F.O.C. with respect to L1 is given by
{IV }+ {V } ≤ cL.
Similarly, the F.O.C. with respect to L2 is
{III}+ {V } ≤ cL.
Finally, the F.O.C. with respect to K is
{III}+ {IV }+ {V } ≤ cK .
As {III} + {IV } + {V } > {IV } + {V } or {III} + {V }, the marginal benefit of
investing in flexible resources is always higher than that in local resources. Furthermore,
the marginal cost of investing in flexible resources is lower since cK < cL. Then we must
have L∗1 = L
∗
2 = 0. Since cK < r, the F.O.C. with respect to K is satisfied with equality.






h(x, y)dydx− 1 + cK = 0.















e−K [1 + α(2e−x − 1)(2ex−K − 1)]dx > 0








e−x−y(2e−x − 1)(2e−y − 1)dydx
=− e−K [K + 3e−K + 2Ke−K − 3].
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It can be shown that there exists a cutoff K¯∗ ≈ 2.15 such that ∂J
∂α
< 0 when K > K¯∗,
and ∂J
∂α
> 0 when K < K¯∗. Because K∗ is decreasing in cK , if cK is small such that
K > K¯∗, then ∂K
∂α








h(x, y)dydx ≈ 0.63 > 0.5,
we must have K∗ < K¯∗ when cK = 0.5.
B Proof of Proposition 2
For firm 1, its equilibrium investment is determined by
1− F (L1) = cL.
As 1− F (L1) > {IV }+ {V }, we must have Lm1 > L∗1 = 0, and hence there is overinvest-
ment. The same happens for firm 2.
















































m) = cK = Ω(0, 0, K
∗).
Suppose that the flexible resource provider invests K such that Lm +K = K∗, Since
Lm > 0, it must be Ω(Lm1 , L
m
2 , K) < Ω(0, 0, K
∗), which means such K cannot be the
equilibrium. Therefore, the flexible resource provider must invest Km such that Lm +
Km < K∗, which implies that Km < K∗ (underinvestment).
C Proof of Proposition 3











h(x, y)dydx− 1 + cK = 0.
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e−x−y(2e−x − 1)(2e−y − 1)dydx.
Similar to Proposition 1, there exists a cutoff K¯m ≈ 1.39 such that ∂Jm
∂α
< 0 when
K > K¯m, and ∂J
m
∂α
> 0 when K < K¯m. Because Km is decreasing in cK , if cK is small
such that K > K¯m, then ∂K
∂α













h(x, y)dydx ≈ 0.72 > 0.5,
we must have Km < K¯m when cK = 0.5.
D Proof of Proposition 4
From Propositions 1 and 3, it suffices to show that ∂J
∂α
(K∗) < 0 if ∂J
m
∂α
(Lm, Km) < 0.
Notice that both terms integrate the same function,
v(x, y) = e−x−y(2e−x − 1)(2e−y − 1),
over the respective area as shown in Figure 2, which can be negative if either x is large









(Lm, Km) < 0, we must have v(x, y) < 0 at points A and B, where point A has
the largest value of y and a small value of x and point B has the largest value of x and
a small value of y. Then we must have v(x, y) < 0 at all the points inside the shaded
triangles: all the points inside the triangle to the left of A have even smaller x and larger








Figure 2: Investments under Social Optimum vs. Monopoly.
Therefore, we must have ∂J
∂α
(K∗) < 0. This implies that under social optimum there is a
larger range of cK under which investment increases with correlation as compared to the
monopoly case.
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